Guarding the aid budget of the world’s most generous donor

When Tvinnereim took office in the fall of 2021, the Centre Party, of which she was deputy head, joined a minority government together with Labour, leaning on support from the Socialist Left Party in Parliament to secure a majority.

The government issued a declaration, the Hurdal Platform, that would guide the work of Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre’s administration. For the new development minister, it contained a formulation that would create problems during her more than three years in office. It stated that the government would use 1 per cent of GNI for “international efforts” to achieve the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Notably, there was no explicit reference to Official Development Assistance (ODA), which has in the past ringfenced what the Norwegian aid budget could be used for.

Tvinnereim says the Labour Party pressed for this formulation as a copy-paste from their party programme, while Centre’s programme was committed to 1 per cent of GNI being spent on activities defined as ODA. “We tried to push for clarity about what the Labour Party meant with this formulation, but we never got a clear answer,” she says to Development Today.

This lack of clarity led to recurring political battles over keeping the aid budget at 1 per cent of GNI and, as minister, Tvinnereim says she continually pushed back attempts to undermine the ODA regime.

Slippery slope

The Ministry of Health was especially active. In the heath sector, a range of initiatives can be viewed as global goods, consistent with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), but are not defined as ODA. Tvinnereim says her deputy Bjørg Sandkjær put in a “heroic” effort to curb such moves.

The Ministry of Finance also tried to unlock the aid budget. It argued that even climate mitigation efforts in Norway supported the SDGs and were, as such, eligible for aid according to formulations in the Hurdal Platform. Tvinnereim says such proposals would of course not have passed the political test.

“I wanted all aid-funded efforts to be in line with ODA rules. If you open that door, it is a slippery slope,” she says.

As a first move, a State Secretary Committee was given the task to agree on exceptions from the ODA definition. It opened for support to countries that have just fallen out of the ODA eligibility list and some health efforts managed by the World Health Organisation (WHO). Tvinnereim describes the exceptions as narrow and unproblematic. 

However, this constant tension over what could be financed out of the aid budget led to the appointment of an expert group, led by Ole Jacob Sending, then Research Director at Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). According to its mandate, the group was asked to advise on the extent to which the aid budget could be used for SDG purposes that did not meet the ODA regulations.   

According to Tvinnereim, the main task of the Sending Commission was to consider how to interpret the formulation about “international efforts” that the Labour Party had inserted into the Hurdal Platform.

The group’s final report went far beyond this remit. It proposed a massive expansion of Norway’s international engagement and widening of the scope. The members wanted to shelter core development aid and humanitarian assistance at a level of 0.7 per cent of GNI and, over time, to use a similar amount to finance global public goods. They did not rule out ODA dropping below 1 per cent of GNI in some years.

“Norway must invest more. We have a self-interest to do so,” Sending said. The experts also proposed a third category of financing - private capital mobilization - amounting to 0.7 per cent of GNI.

Wrong timing

Tvinnereim says the Sending Commission’s report turned out to be something far beyond what she had asked for.

“It was very exciting work and a meta-rethink of Norwegian aid. But the timing was wrong given the pressure I was under trying to maintain a bare minimum, while almost all countries around us were cutting their aid,” she says. The populist right-wing Progress Party and some parts of her own party were eager to follow this trend. Tvinnereim says the Sending Commission’s proposals were in some settings counterproductive, and they weakened her negotiating position. “Some proposals were so far-out that we were met with laughter,” she says.

Tvinnereim says the intention of the group of experts was good, but she is surprised they did not have a better read of the political landscape. “It’s something that really frustrated me. I do not think the discussion that followed was good for the Norwegian aid debate. At times, it took place on another planet, compared with the trends we saw around us,” she says. 

Some leaders in the Norwegian NGO community with an understanding of politics saw what was at stake and toned down their engagement in the debate, she notes. 

The situation was further complicated when the Director General of Norad Bård Vegar Solhjell, inspired by the Sending Commission’s report, wrote an op-ed for the Norwegian weekly Morgenbladet on “Aid 2.0” in early January 2024. It injected fuel into the debate. “It was not helpful in my internal discussions in government,” is all she wants to say on the matter.

The 1 per cent of GNI challenge

A year after Tvinnereim took office, in the fall of 2022, it was clear that the Norwegian petroleum economy was growing at a rate never seen before, fuelled by the energy crisis in Europe related to the war in Ukraine. In this exceptional situation, Norway’s GNI was estimated to grow by 60 per cent over two years, though the estimates varied wildly through the budget year due to the volatile circumstances.

Despite huge inflows of revenue into the state coffers, the government initially presented only a moderate increase in aid for the following year estimated at 0.75 per cent of GNI, the lowest aid level in 47 years.

The criticism was massive. In an interview with Development Today, Secretary General of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) Jan Egeland described it as “an enormous betrayal of the solidarity ideal of the Labour movement, both politically and morally indefensible.”

Eventually, the government added almost NOK 15 billion to the aid budget in order to reach the 1 per cent of GNI goal in 2023. Reflecting on this now, Tvinnereim says the Ministry of Finance had good arguments for its initial concerns and it was understandable that questions were raised about how so much extra money would be spent. “It was really not that surprising,” she says.

Most of these additional funds took the form of the so-called Nansen Programme for Ukraine, which amounted to NOK 7.5 billion in civilian support and a NOK 5 billion “South Package” to support developing countries affected by the Ukrainian war. This was agreed by consensus in the Parliament.

Tvinnereim says she would have preferred that the Nansen Programme not be ODA-funded. “Originally, I felt that the Ukraine aid should come from outside the 1 per cent of GNI. But it was unthinkable that I could make that happen. I had zero support for it, with the possible exception of the Christian Democrats and Socialist Left,” she says.

“What saved us was the South Package related to Ukraine,” says Tvinnereim. She underlines that it had strong backing of the Prime Minister.

“The South Package was important to reach the 1 per cent goal, and symbolically abroad. I got so much positive feedback on adding these funds to the Ukraine programme. It was extremely important and unique, and it was applauded by partner countries, the World Bank, and the UN. It was a pity it was not continued,” she says.

When the OECD finalised its aid tally for 2023, Norwegian aid amounted to 1.09 per cent of GNI; the only donor to reach 1 per cent. Norway also had the highest aid level in 2024, becoming for the first time the largest Nordic donor in real terms (USD 5.2 billion), bypassing Sweden. 

Kicking in open doors

Tvinnereim comes from an agricultural background, and one of her ambitions as minister was to make food security a key priority of Norwegian aid. She recounts that at first, she faced scepticism both from the aid administration and politically.  But global events would turn food into a hot political theme.

In Europe, the war in Ukraine jeopardized global food security triggering rising food prices. Suddenly, food was at the centre of world politics and top officials in the Foreign Ministry recognized the shift. “Focusing on food security opened many doors in the World Bank and the UN, which had called for more attention on this issue. It actually felt like kicking in open doors,” she says.

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s commitment to the issue during his G20 Presidency last year added political weight. “Somehow, this helped me save food security as a priority in Norwegian aid. When we became a G20 guest country, my colleagues in government noticed of course that the fight against hunger was one of Lula’s main priorities,” she says.

Tvinnereim says Norway’s partner countries have for a long time wanted a dialogue about agriculture, and many African governments have food production and food security high on their domestic agendas. Donors have not always been enthusiastic. “I think many Norwegian diplomats discovered that food security was a door opener for bilateral cooperation,” she says.

The former minister notes that her successor Åsmund Aukrust will have his own priorities “and that is totally fair.” At the same time, she believes that both the ministry and the embassies have understood the importance of food security in dialogue with partner countries, and she hopes that will continue.

World Bank and IDA

Among the last big challenges Tvinnereim faced as minister was the replenishment for IDA21, the World Bank’s arm for providing financing across sectors in 78 low-income countries. Over two-thirds of IDA funding goes to African countries, and it is their largest source of multilateral development finance. Norway’s IDA contribution had stagnated for two decades, with rising aid budgets being spent instead on national priorities such as the rainforest initiative, Gavi, and multiple earmarked funds in the World Bank and the UN.

“Everybody in the political leadership agreed that we wanted the IDA contribution to be as high as possible. I think it is an effective channel and President Ajay Banga is a brilliant leader, who has made changes in the bank that Norway wanted to support” she says.

The problem was to find the money. The IDA21 replenishment came in the middle of what the Washington-based Center for Global Development called a replenishment “traffic jam”. Close to a dozen multilateral concessional funds and agencies were seeking about USD 100 billion in donor grants in the space of little more than a year.

Denmark sped up the process by announcing its IDA21 pledge of DKK 3.3 billion in New York in September. This represented a 40 per cent increase on the previous Danish contribution. The Bank wanted Norway to make its pledge known at the World Bank annual meeting the following month. Tvinnereim decided to tap into budget lines parliament had reserved for food security to finance the IDA pledge. “For me, that was a win-win,” she says.

The Foreign Ministry in Oslo even prepared to make a pledge, but Tvinnereim put on the brakes. An early announcement was impossible due to tightened procedures for making multi-year pledges, initiated by the Prime Minister’s office. In the past, foreign and development ministers had in practice more liberty to make decisions about multi-year funding. This carried little risk because budgets were growing each year. Støre put an end to this early on in his term. “There were new routines to assure that such pledges had first to be approved by the government,” she says.

As it turned out, Støre favoured a solid IDA pledge and had discussed the matter with President Banga earlier. “I eventually got the greenlight,” says Tvinnereim. “Had someone asked me a few weeks before, I would not believe we could reach such a high IDA pledge.”

Støre announced the Norwegian pledge at the G20 summit in Brazil in early November 2024. Norway increased its IDA allocation by 50 per cent (in NOK) compared to the current period, highlighting IDA’s role in supporting food security, agriculture, adaptation, and energy transition in Africa.

Food security is now embedded in the Norwegian pledge for IDA21, which runs over three years. “I feel certain that the Foreign Ministry sees huge advantages in continuing these efforts which are of high priority for cooperation partners,” Tvinnereim says.

Backing in the government

Aid policy is not rooted in domestic affairs in the same way as other sectors like road building, education or social welfare. Voters are not directly affected by aid-funded projects and programmes implemented in far-away countries. In a government, keeping aid at a high level requires key cabinet members and the Prime Minister to have a certain engagement in aid.

Asked about this dynamic, Tvinnereim says she experienced solid support from Prime Minister Støre. “He is concerned about the aid budget and that it should be generous. I experience Jonas as dedicated to development and aid. But Ukraine takes increasing space. I think we will see Ukraine absorb an even larger share of the aid budget in the future,” she says.

She adds that she also had full support from Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide. “There were no disagreements about priorities between us,” she says.

Though the development portfolio was not a top priority for the Centre Party, Tvinnereim, who has been both a diplomat and an official at Norad, wanted this position in the government.

Previously, the development minister was often perceived as a junior post. Did being deputy leader of the Centre Party give her more political leverage in decision making? “Absolutely,” she says. “But when things get really intense in budget negotiations, the development post is still a lighter-weight post. Then, it is the political realities that count.”

As deputy head of a party, Tvinnereim was probably the first development minister to be ranked higher in a government than the foreign minister when sitting around the King’s Table. “This was of course symbolic. But in my office, we thought it was a bit fun anyway,” she admits. 

The extension of Norad

Tvinnereim’s predecessor Dag-Inge Ulstein (Christian Democrat) opposed a plan to clip the wings of Norad and integrate most of its functions into the Foreign Ministry. Instead, he expanded the agency and greatly increased Norad’s fund management. This process continued under Tvinnereim. The agency now handles Ukraine aid as well as humanitarian assistance, which was formerly the responsibility of the Foreign Minister. “This might be one of the political moves I am proudest of. Humanitarian aid is now under the development minister where it belongs,” she says.

There had been calls to reduce the number of staff at the Foreign Ministry and this was one of the considerations when humanitarian aid was transferred to Norad. Analysts have in the past pointed to humanitarian aid being an important tool for the Foreign Ministry, but Tvinnereim defends the move. “It was the right thing to do, but my politician heart bleeds a bit,” she says.

She adds that Norad has much better administrative competence to manage funds than the ministry. The staff are better trained for it.

This expansion has resulted in more generalists being recruited to Norad. Tvinnereim notes that one of the agency’s traditional strengths has been staff with experience from the field. “It was important for me to make it easier for Norad staff to serve at the embassies. We made sure they compete on equal terms with Foreign Ministry staff. I think it is very important that Norad and Norec staff continue to have experience from diplomatic stations abroad,” she says.

An area where Tvinnereim did not cross the finish line was the large number of earmarked funds that Norway finances. The former minister says she asked for a report to guide the process of getting control of this multitude of funds. Though the report was finished last fall, she felt it did not go far enough and sent it back.

“It has been a sluggish and complicated process, and we simply did not manage to finish it. A lot more can be cut. There is still a lot to clean up in this area,” she says.

The self-interest narrative

Tvinnereim doubts how well Norwegian aid engagement is anchored with voters, and especially among people outside the Oslo area. She strongly dislikes the increasingly elitist tone of the aid sector and the tendency for debates to become very theoretical. As a politician, she made a point of saying no to many of the “breakfast seminars” about aid in the capital. “The impression on social media is that people sit around and drink their morning coffee at seminars in Oslo. This can weaken the legitimacy of Norwegian aid,” she says.

Tvinnereim says that an advantage of being deputy of her party was that she travelled a lot to many corners in the country. “I always included something from my role as development minister. I got fantastic feedback about what we are doing. I talked to people in local communities across the country, from Agder to Finnmark. In their hearts, people still have an engagement for aid and for Norway to contribute internationally, but the messaging must be tangible,” she says.

Despite Norway’s enormous wealth, with USD 1.7 trillion sitting in the oil fund, the former minister fears that keeping Norwegian aid at 1 per cent of GNI is under pressure. She does not think it is sufficient to argue from a moral vantage point as the Christian Democrats have done. “I do not think that works anymore, and it does not work in challenging government negotiations,” she says. 

Instead, more weight must be put on self-interest, including areas like security and climate. Tvinnereim says Norway’s broad aid engagement generates huge soft power around the world. It has also been notable when Norway has engaged with Brazil and South Africa as a G20 guest country. 

“In the near future, more aid will go to Ukraine at the expense of assistance to other parts of the world,” she says. “I felt these dynamics as minister. I made a deliberate choice to talk more about our self-interest, first internally, but eventually also in the media. We must argue about soft power and our own security, otherwise I do not think we stand a chance.” 

Tvinnerein stepped down in February after her party left the government, following disagreement over Norway’s adoption of EU energy directives. The Centre Party is known for its opposition to Norwegian membership in the EU.